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FEDERAL CoURTs-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EFFECT OF ExcusING PROCEDURE
ON CoMPOSITION OF JURY PANEL-Petitioner was found guilty of violating the
Harrison Narcotics Act1 in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia
by a jury composed wholly of federal employees.2 During the course of 11oir dire
examination, petitioner moved to strike the entire panel, asserting that it did not
represent a proper cross-section of the community. This motion was denied. Petitioner exhausted his ten peremptory challenges, and, upon finding that only government employees remained on the jury, then challenged the jury as impaneled
for cause. The challenge was overruled. Conviction was affirmed by the circuit
court of appeals.3 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. In absence of affirmative evidence showing systematic exclusion of a
particular class or occupational group, the fact that a panel may not represent
a cross-section of the community is insufficient to sustain a motion to strike the
entire panel. Nor does final composition of the jury entirely of government employees afford a basis for challenge for cause. Frazier 11. United States, (U.S.,
1948) 69 S.Ct. 201.
The common law rule that a servant of one of the parties to litigation is incom-

153 Stat. L. 271 (1939), 26 U.S.C. (1946) § 2553.
2 Moreover, one of the jurors and the wife of a second were employed in the Treasury
Department, which branch is charged with administration and enforcement of federal narcotics
laws. 46 Stat. L. 585 (1930), 5 U.S.C. (1946) § 282.
3 Frazier v. United States, (App. D.C., 1947) 163 F. (2d) 817.
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petent for jury service is generally considered to be the law today.4 It is not clear
whether crown servants were qualified as jurors in criminal cases at common law.;;
However, the Supreme Court, in 1909, seized upon a somewhat ambiguous statement by Blackstone6 to dictate a broad rule that government employees were
incompetent to serve as jurors in cases in which the United States was a party.7
Practical difficulties arose from this decision because of the large number of federal
workers in such places as the District of Columbia8 and the Canal Zone.9 Legislative repeal of the rule resulted.10 Sustaining the constitutionality of the statute
which qualified federal employees for jury duty, the Supreme Court in United
States v. W ood11 pointed out that the Sixth Amendment, guaranteeing trial by
an "impartial jury," prescribes no specific tests for determining impartiality.12 It
is clear that a litigant is not entitled to have any particular class of persons represented on a jury.13 On the other hand, the categorical exclusion of Negroes,1 4
women15 or members of a political party16 has been held not to satisfy the requirement of impartiality. More recently, the practice of systematically excluding an
occupational group, such as daily wage earners, was stricken down in Thiel v.
Southern Paci-fie Co.17 There the Court concluded that a reluctance to imopse
financial hardship on lower income groups because of inadequate compensation
for jury duty was outweighed by the policy which favors having all classes of
persons available for jury service.18 In the principal case, petitioner asserts that
35 C.J., Juries § 338 (1924).
Cf. 5 BACON ABRIDGMENT, Bouvier ed., 355 (1844); DuNcoMBB, TRIAL PER PAis.
8th ed., 189 (1766); 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CRoWN, 6th ed., c.43, 579 (1788); also 50
HARV. L. Rnv. 692 (1937).
6 3 BLACKST. CoMM., Wendell ed., 363 (1854).
7 Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 29 S.Ct. 260 (1909).
8 See 79 CoNG. Rnc. 13,401 (1935).
9 See Schackow v. Government of the Canal Zone, (C.C.A. 5th, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 625.
10 49 Stat. L. 682 (1935), 11 D.C. Code (1940) § 1420.
11299 U.S. 123, 57 S.Ct. 177 (1936). Though the statute applied only in the District
of Columbia, the effect of the Wood decision was to make federal employees competent
throughout the United States.
12 For discussion of objectives and methods of jury selection in federal courts, see:
Blume, "Jury Selection Analyzed: Proposed Revision of Federal System," 42 l\lhca. L. Rnv.
831 (1944); Knox, "Selecting Jurors for Service in the District Courts of the United States,"
21 DICTA 283 (1944); Ons, SELECTING FEDERAL CounT Junons (1942).
13 35 C.J. 143 (1924). Thus, it is not ground for complaint that a particular jury doeS
not contain Negroes, Jackson v. State, 180 Md. 658, 26 A. (2d) 815 (1942); Masons, People
v. Jennett, 3 Wend. (N.Y.) 314 (1829), or Socialists, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S.
480, 38 S.Ct. 168 (1918).
14 Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 61 S.Ct. 164 (1940).
IG Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 67 S.Ct. 261 (1946).
10 United States v. Murphy, (D.C. N.Y. 1915) 224 F. 554.
17 328 U.S. 217, 66 S.Ct. 984 (1946); see Goodman, "Federal Jury System as Affected
by Thiel v. So. Pacific Co.," 21 CALIF. S.B.J. 352 (1946).
18 In light of the Thiel decision, it is interesting to note the recent revision of the Judicial
Code, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. 1948), which became effective September 1, 1948. Section 1863
(b) authorizes a district judge to exclude "any class or group of persons •.. by an order ...
based on a finding that such jury service would entail undue hardship... .''
-1.
5

846

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol: 47

when the jury panel was drawn, the court -asked all those who did not wish to
serve to step aside, and they were excused. While the majority holds such facts to
be insufficient asa foundation for complaint, Justice Jackson, dissenting, maintains
that such a procedure when coupled with the dual system of compensation for
jurors which prevails in the District of Columbia19 inherently tends to produce
a partial jury. Conceding that such a system naturally tends to distort the composition of federal juries in the District of Columbia, the answer, it would seem, lies
in legislative action to raise the compensation for jury service and to restrict judicial power to excuse persons from jury duty. If the Court accepts ·the rule of the
Wood case that government employment is not per se ground for disqualification
as a federal juror, it would appear inconsequential, in the absence of actual bias,
that a particular jury happens to be composed of four, 20 nine21 or twelve government employees.
Robert P. Griffin

19 Principal case at 211. Non-government jurors receive $4 per day, 11 D.C: Code
(1940) § 1513, while government jurors are given leave with full pay, U D.C. Code (1940)
§§1421-1423.
20 See Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. District of Columbia, (App. D.C., 1937)
89 F. (2d) 502.
.
21 See Higgins v. United States, (App. D.C., 1946) 160 F. (2d) 222.

